Filed 3/30/10 Marriage of Maassen CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re Marriage of BARBARA and MARC MAASSEN.	B204075 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BD375652)
BARBARA MAASSEN, Appellant, v. MARC MAASSEN, Respondent.	

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Gretchen Taylor, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Barbara Maassen, in pro. per.; Law Offices of Joseph R. Haytas, Joseph R. Haytas; Law Firm of Yolanda V. Torres and Yolanda V. Torres for Appellant.

Lascher & Lascher, Wendy Cole Lascher, Aris E. Karakalos and Eric R. Reed for Respondent.

Barbara Maassen appeals the judgment in this marital dissolution action, claiming that the trial court should have imposed sanctions and attorney fees against Marc Maassen under specific provisions of the Family Code, as well as ordering spousal support. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We take the relevant facts from the trial court's judgment. The Maassens were married in 1980 and separated in 2002. They have one adult child. The judgment of dissolution of marriage was filed on March 12, 2007. The court entered judgment on reserved issues on November 8, 2007. The court found that neither party breached his or her fiduciary duties to the other party during the marriage, but that Marc[1] breached his fiduciary duties to Barbara after the date of separation. The court ordered no spousal support, divided community assets, confirmed the parties' separate property, allocated debts and liabilities, and awarded a series of credits and reimbursements between Marc and Barbara, with an equalization payment ordered from Marc to Barbara. The court ordered each party to bear his or her own attorney fees. Barbara appeals.[2]

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[1] Because the parties share the same surname, we refer to them by their first names for purposes of clarity, intending no disrespect.

[2] California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) requires appellants to "[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record." "In every appeal, 'the appellant has the duty to fairly summarize all of the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment. [Citation.] Further, the burden to provide a fair summary of the evidence "grows with the complexity of the record. [Citation.]" [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (*Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc.* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 739.) Barbara's opening brief contains a section entitled, "Statement of Facts," but rather than laying out a coherent factual and procedural history of this matter, this section consists largely of a recitation of arguments that the trial court erred in various respects. Moreover, the majority of the purported facts in the "Statement of Facts" lack any citation to evidence in the record to support them. "Statements of fact that are not supported by references in the record are disregarded by the reviewing court." (*McOwen v. Grossman* (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 947 (*McOwen*).) Those citations that are provided are in multiple instances citations

DISCUSSION

I. Sanctions and Attorney Fees

Barbara contends that the trial court erred by failing to impose monetary sanctions against Marc that she claims were mandated by law. She begins her argument with an extensive discussion of the fiduciary duties owed by spouses after separation, the intersection between dissolution inspection rights and shareholder inspections, the existence of strong public policy in favor of full disclosure of financial information during dissolution actions, and the obligations that Marc failed to fulfill. As there is no question here but that the court found that Marc breached his fiduciary duties to Barbara, these issues are not in dispute.

Barbara then asserts that the trial court erred in not enforcing Marc's duty to disclose all facts and information concerning the identity of assets and liabilities, characterization and valuation of assets and liabilities, and relating to the income and expenses of the parties, although she does not identify any instance in which she requested the court's assistance or any way in which this is purported failure is a ground for appeal. We do not doubt that the trial court had the authority to order Marc to fulfill his fiduciary duties, but with this argument Barbara does not offer any cogent legal argument as to why the judgment is erroneous.

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to large blocks of pages rather than to the exact pages where relevant information can be found, a violation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). (*Nazari v. Ayrapetyan* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 690, 694, fn. 1 [citation with block page references "frustrates this court's ability to evaluate *which facts* a party believes support his position, particularly when a large portion of that citation referred to points that appeared to be irrelevant"].) Also improper are Barbara's invitations to this court to review specific documents in the record rather than setting out their contents with appropriate citations in the brief. (*Paterno v. State of California* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 109 (*Paterno*).) These deficiencies alone would permit us to strike appellant's brief, but we elect to disregard the noncompliance and reach the merits where possible. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(e)(2)(C).)

Barbara next contends that payment of attorney fees by Marc was mandatory under Family Code[3] section 1101, subdivision (g), relying on *In re Marriage of Hokanson* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 987, 993. Barbara asserts that the court "should have entered the requested fee award" based on this section. We have reviewed the declaration that Barbara submitted requesting attorney fees and sanctions. In that document, Barbara made detailed arguments for a number of factual and legal grounds on which she was requesting her award, but she neither asked for fees pursuant to section 1101, subdivision (g), nor did she tell the court what portion of her requested fees related to this issue. A party cannot fault the court for failing to make an attorney fee award and an allocation of assets when she neither requested relief under that provision nor provided the court with the information necessary to allocate which portions of the attorney fees are properly attributable to the breach of fiduciary duties. Having sought attorney fees on one statutory ground in the trial court, a party may not assert a new, previously unmentioned statutory basis for the recovery of attorney fees on appeal. (*Planned Protective Services, Inc. v. Gorton* (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1, 12-13, disapproved on other grounds by *Martin v. Szeto* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 445, 451, fn. 7.)

Barbara also contends, elsewhere in her brief, that for every breach of fiduciary duty the court should have allocated the involved asset to her on a 50 percent or 100 percent basis based on sections 1101, subdivision (g) and 1101, subdivision (h), but she has not demonstrated that she ever asked the trial court to make asset allocations pursuant to these provisions and that the court declined to do so.

Barbara argues that the court was required to order monetary sanctions, including her attorney fees, under section 2107, subdivision (c). Barbara's briefing on this subject describes her view of the ways that Marc failed to comply with his fiduciary duties and the law with respect to a spouse's obligations. She does not, however, include any citation to the record demonstrating that she requested sanctions or attorney fees pursuant to section 2107, subdivision (c) or that she asked the court to make the findings that she

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[3] Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Family Code.

now claims the court should have made under section 2102 to support the imposition of sanctions under section 2107, subdivision (c). Instead, it appears from our review of the sanctions declaration that Barbara requested sanctions and attorney fees on a number of other grounds. Although Barbara is correct that section 2107, subdivision (c) contains mandatory language and has been interpreted to require the trial court to impose sanctions for noncompliance with the relevant statutes, in the case from which Barbara derives this rule the wife had moved for sanctions under sections 2107, subdivision (c); 1101, subdivision (g); and 271, subdivision (a). (*In re Marriage of Feldman* (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1474, 1477 (*Feldman*).) Barbara offers no authority to support the principle that the trial court must sua sponte impose sanctions under this provision even if the complying party does not seek them, nor have we found any such authority. Moreover, nowhere have we found any authority stating that a party may move for sanctions on a ground other than section 2107, subdivision (c), then appeal the resulting sanctions and fees order on the ground that under section 2107, subdivision (c), sanctions and fees were mandatory. (*In re S.C.* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 406 [contentions not raised in the trial court are not considered on appeal, based on considerations of fairness to the court and the opposing party, and on the need for an orderly and efficient administration of the law].)

Barbara also complains of the trial court's ruling under section 271, subdivision (a), arguing as follows: "Marc's lack of disclosure and cooperation clearly frustrated 'the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys'. Thus, the court has the discretion to award attorney fees as sanctions pursuant to this section." This argument establishes only that the trial court had the discretion to award attorney fees, not that it abused its discretion in any way. With this argument Barbara has not established any error here.

It is not clear whether Barbara means to argue that the court's ultimate ruling on attorney fees and sanctions constituted an abuse of discretion, but out of caution we review the ruling. The trial court sanctioned Marc for breaching his fiduciary duties by

declining to require Barbara to contribute to his fees and costs on the theory of ability and need, as she would otherwise have been required to do under section 2030, subdivision (a)(2). The court concluded that to hold Marc responsible for all of Barbara's fees, however, would be unreasonable under the circumstances because Barbara retained "upwards of ten attorneys" before representing herself in propria persona, driving up her own legal fees in a manner for which Marc was not responsible; Barbara was herself uncooperative during the discovery process, based on specific incidents recited by the trial court; and both parties were responsible for the failure of settlement efforts. The court concluded that Marc had paid more toward Barbara's legal fees ($30,000) than Barbara had paid toward Marc's ($8,000), and it declined to equalize those amounts, leaving a disparity in Barbara's favor. The court concluded that the parties should bear the rest of their attorney fees individually. Barbara has not demonstrated that this was an abuse of discretion, nor can we identify any abuse of the court's discretion here. (*Feldman*, *supra*, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1478.)

II. Accounting Request

Mentioning provisions of the Family Code that authorize a trial court to order an accounting, Barbara claims that one should be ordered "so that once and for all the court will know exactly the fair share of the community to which Barbara is entitled." Barbara also contends that an accounting is necessary because she was compelled to spend her separate property funds on community debts, with the characterization and division of those debts reserved for further hearings. Barbara provides no citations to the record or further argument for the need for an accounting.

These arguments appear to be arguments better directed toward the trial court. This is an appeal from a dissolution judgment, and it appears from the statements of decision provided to this court that the trial court has already determined "the fair share of the community to which Barbara is entitled." If Barbara believed that the information available to her was insufficient, she could have sought further disclosures or an

accounting in the trial court prior to the distribution of marital property; she has not argued or offered factual support demonstrating that she did so and was denied. To the extent that Barbara needs an accounting because there will be further hearings on debts and characterizations of payments, she may seek an accounting as to those issues from the trial court in conjunction with the determination of those issues there. In neither respect, however, has Barbara demonstrated any error in the distribution of marital property, nor has she shown that an accounting or any revisiting of the distributions is required or appropriate.

III. Failure to Award Spousal Support

Barbara argues that the trial court failed to consider all the factors of section 4320 when considering spousal support and that it should have ordered that Marc pay spousal support to her.

In making a determination whether to award spousal support, the trial court "*must* consider and weigh all of the circumstances enumerated in the statute [section 4320], to the extent they are relevant to the case before it." (*In re Marriage of Cheriton* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 302 (*Cheriton*).) Barbara appears to contend that the trial court ignored two relevant factors in the spousal support determination. First, she claims that the court failed to consider section 4320, subdivision (i), the "[d]ocumented evidence of any history of domestic violence, as defined in Section 6211, between the parties, including, but not limited to, consideration of emotional distress resulting from domestic violence perpetrated against the supported party by the supporting party, and consideration of any history of violence against the supporting party by the supported party." Second, she claims that the court disregarded "[t]he goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time. Except in the case of a marriage of long duration as described in Section 4336, a 'reasonable period of time' for purposes of this section generally shall be one-half the length of the marriage. However, nothing in this section is intended to limit the court's discretion to order support for a greater or lesser

length of time, based on any of the other factors listed in this section, Section 4336, and the circumstances of the parties." (§ 4320, subd. (*l*).)

Barbara has not established that the trial court ignored relevant factors. With respect to domestic violence, she contends that Marc abused her before and after separation. Barbara, however, cites to nothing in the record that would demonstrate that any "[d]ocumented evidence of any history of domestic violence" (§ 4320, subd. (i)) was presented to the court. "[A]n appellate court cannot be expected to search through a voluminous record to discover evidence on a point raised by appellant when his brief makes no reference to the pages where the evidence on the point can be found in the record." (*Metzenbaum v. Metzenbaum* (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 197, 199 (*Metzenbaum*).) We disregard statements of fact that are not supported by references in the record. (*McOwen*, *supra*, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) Barbara, therefore, has not demonstrated that there was evidence before the trial court that would make this statutory factor "relevant to the case before it." (*Cheriton*, *supra*, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 302.)

With respect to the second factor Barbara claims the trial court ignored, the goal that the supported party be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time, the trial court's ruling demonstrates that the court considered this factor in its ultimate decision on spousal support. While the trial court did find that the marriage was of long duration and that petitioner had little work or earnings history, the court also found that Barbara had received *Gavron* warnings (*In re Marriage of Gavron* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705), that she was employable, and that she could obtain marketable skills without too much difficulty "given her academic degrees and the obvious energy and intelligence that she has proven to have and that she has devoted to this litigation." The court found that Barbara was capable of earning between $2,500 and $3,000 per month, a sum that would not permit her to maintain her pre-separation standard of living, but that Marc was also not capable of maintaining the standard of living established during the marriage, leaving both with "vast unmet needs based upon the standard of living of the marriage." In light of the overall circumstances of the parties and Barbara's present ability to support herself, the trial court ordered no spousal support.

Barbara has not shown that the trial court failed to consider this factor. Section 4320, subdivision (*l*) states that "nothing in this section is intended to limit the court's discretion to order support for a greater or lesser length of time, based on any of the other factors listed in this section, Section 4336, and the circumstances of the parties." The court found the totality of the relevant circumstances to indicate that each spouse could take care of himself or herself financially, although neither could maintain the standard of living to which he or she had become accustomed prior to separation. In light of the repeated warnings to Barbara that she would have to become financially independent and the court's finding that she was capable of earning approximately $2,500 per month, as well as the lack of evidence as to Marc's earning capacity, the court concluded that spousal support should not be awarded; however, the court retained jurisdiction over support so that the support question could be revisited if a change in circumstances occurred. Barbara's entire argument with respect to this factor is that "[b]y virtue of the facts that Barbara has not worked in many years, possesses no marketable skills, has no means of support and was married to Marc for more than 22 years, Barbara is clearly entitled to spousal support." The trial court concluded otherwise, and Barbara has not shown that the court's factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence or that the trial court's ruling on support was an abuse of discretion.

Barbara does not specifically contend that the trial court ignored any other statutory factors; the remainder of her argument appears to be a claim that the trial court weighed the relevant factors improperly: that is, that it abused its discretion. For instance, she lists the first factor under section 4320, the extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living during the marriage, and argues she should have received support because: she is in her sixties; she has not worked in many years; she would need significant retraining to enter the job market; she should have received spousal support during the time she was acquiring new skills; there is little demand for 60-year-olds in the job market; she needs spousal support for the rest of her life. This assertions, all recited without a single citation to the large record, have very little to do with the actual factor she purports to be discussing, and they do not

establish any error in the court's contrary findings concerning her earning capacity. Moreover, her argument does not address Marc's earning capacity or the court's finding that at present, the parties simply could not maintain their pre-separation standard of living. Barbara has not established any abuse of discretion or error here.

The same is true for Barbara's other arguments concerning support. She outlines different support considerations set forth in the Family Code and then argues that she should receive support, but she does not support her assertions with citations to the factual record or to any authority, and she does not demonstrate any way in which the factual findings or the ultimate spousal support determination by the court was in error. Barbara has not established that the trial court failed to consider all relevant factors or that it abused its discretion when it declined to award her spousal support.

IV. Alleged Court Errors

In a section of her opening brief wedged between her statement of facts and her legal arguments, Barbara discusses what she labels "court errors." This is a recitation of complaints about the trial court—most without citation to factual support, all without citation to legal authority, and many dependent upon a review of a document filed in the trial court. Barbara's presentation is entirely insufficient to raise these issues before this court (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)), as shown below.

Barbara's first contention is that her former counsel "points out" the commissioner's promises to "help" Barbara if she remained in propria persona, which Barbara claims misled her into believing that she would be able to easily introduce her exhibits and reimbursement claims into evidence. Barbara does not identify any instance in the record where the commissioner made these alleged promises. This is insufficient to present a claim for review. We "cannot be expected to search through a voluminous record to discover evidence" to which the appellant has not directed us by page citations. (*Metzenbaum, supra*, 96 Cal.App.2d at p. 199.)

Next, Barbara complains about the court's mailing practices, claiming that the court did not mail "the appeals" on time. We do not know how the trial court would be involved in mailing appeals, nor does she explain further. She complains about the dates that three documents were mailed, but offers no citation to the record to support her claims about the dates on the documents or their envelopes. "To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error." (*In re S.C.*, *supra*, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) Barbara has not done so here.

Barbara then states that her objections to one of the court's statements of decision "point[] out a number of court errors." Barbara gives a citation to that document in its entirety—it is just under 300 pages long. She claims that the document identifies errors with respect to Marc's ability to pay spousal support, the payment of community debts out of Barbara's separate property, the admission of evidence, the statements of decision, and other, unspecified determinations. With respect to the spousal support argument, Barbara challenges the court's conclusion that it had no evidence that established Marc's earning capacity, though the court believed him to be employable. Barbara claims that a wide range of evidence establishes Marc's income, but beyond a citation to one sheet of paper in the record that listed a purported daily rate for consulting, she provides no citations to the record to support her statements of what the evidence showed in terms of tax returns, stock transaction records, representations by Marc, employment contracts, his resume, and other records. We have looked at the evidence that Barbara did identify—an invoice from Freestone Advisors LLC for what appeared to be attendance at a conference. There, an entry read, "Consulting Services 2 days @ $1,800.00/day," for which "No Charge" was imposed. We cannot conclude that this invoice, which listed a rate but charged nothing to a client, undermines the trial court's conclusion that she lacked specific evidence as to Marc's earning capacity. Barbara has not demonstrated any error by the trial court here.

Barbara's argument about payment of community debts includes only one citation to the record—a citation to what Barbara listed on her reimbursement schedule. Barbara

includes no citations to the record to support her other factual contentions; she includes no references to the law; and she makes only a flat assertion that the court erred in permitting Marc to keep "undisclosed and/or liquidated income in all forms, stocks, assets, retirement funds, our daughter's college fund," without any specific allegations of which asset allocations were in error and what evidence supported the contention that they were misallocated. "We need not address points in appellate briefs that are unsupported by adequate factual or legal analysis." (*Placer County Local Agency Formation Com. v. Nevada County Local Agency Formation Com*. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 793, 814 (*Placer*).)

Barbara next makes an argument entitled, "Admission of Evidence." She asserts that the evidence is clear, as shown by the 20 volumes of clerk's transcripts, that Barbara has presented evidence proving Marc's earnings and concealed and liquidated assets, and his disclosure derelictions. She contends that she was confused by court procedures and conflicting statements by the trial court, and that she submitted some of her evidence more than once resulting in the court failing to receive some of her evidence. Barbara does not identify any purported conflicting statements or state where they can be found in the record, nor does she identify or provide citations to the record concerning whatever evidence she thinks the court failed to receive. Barbara concludes, without further explanation, by asserting that although the trial court stated that it had reviewed the entire file, "she had not or she could not have ruled as she did." These assertions are completely insufficient to present an issue for review. "A reviewing court need not consider alleged error when the appellant merely complains of it without pertinent argument." (*Downey Savings & Loan Assn. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co*. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1072, 1090.) Conclusory claims of error, such as this, necessarily fail. (*In re S.C.*, *supra*, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)

In an argument entitled, "Mistakes on Propertizer and Statements of Decision," Barbara contends that she and her counsel pointed out errors "numerous times," and that "[t]here were so many errors in the proposed statements of decision prepared by Respondent's counsel that favored him, as well as 'errata' that Petitioner had to file

numerous objections to the decisions." Barbara purports to "call[] the Court's attention to all responses and objections prepared by Frank Tetley and Barbara Maassen since Wednesday, May 23, 2007. The numerous mistakes on each proposed statement of decision and the final statements of decision are well enumerated in those documents." This is improper. "An appellant cannot rely on incorporation of trial court papers, but must tender arguments *in the appellate briefs*." (*Paterno, supra*, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 109.) Barbara's blanket assertions of trial court error are completely misplaced. "'It is the duty of counsel by argument and citation of authority to show in what manner rulings complained of are erroneous. We are not obliged to perform the duty resting on counsel.' [Citation.]" (*Givens v. Southern Pac. Co.* (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 39, 48.) "It is not our responsibility to develop an appellant's argument." (*Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp*. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1206, fn. 11.)

Barbara concludes this section with a heading entitled, "Other Court Errors." Here, she complains that the trial court erred by "taking away Barbara's right to a fair trial by showing bias against her in pro per in favor of Respondent and his counsel." She provides no citations to instances where this alleged bias or favoritism occurred. "When an appellant's brief makes no reference to the pages of the record where a point can be found, an appellate court need not search through the record in an effort to discover the point purportedly made." (*In re S.C., supra*, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 406.) She contends that the court improperly froze $100,000 of her sole and separate property, then awarded some $43,000 of that to Marc; but here again, she does not identify when or how this happened, nor does she provide any legal argument as to why the court erred in this regard. Appellants must demonstrate error by presenting "meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error." (*Id*. at p. 408.) Barbara claims the trial court broke promises to help her if she continued in propria persona, but she identifies no promises in the record or instances in which they were allegedly broken, nor has she shown by legal argument that the court erred in any respect.

Barbara then claims that the court erred when it did not admit "most of Barbara's reimbursements and exhibits," and when it purportedly held her to a higher burden of proof than Marc had. She cites here to 10 pages of the reporter's transcript, but does not identify any specific evidence that should have been admitted, identifies no instance in which the parties were held to differing standards of proof, and provides no argument as to why any specific evidence should have been admitted. This is entirely insufficient to state an issue on appeal—in fact, it is an even more deficient showing than that in *Givens v. Southern Pacific Company*, *supra*, 194 Cal.App.2d at pages 47 and 48, where the court stated, "In a blanket statement plaintiff says the court erred in the exclusion of evidence, merely giving references to the reporter's transcript. He does not tell us what the proposed evidence was. We are not advised of the subject matter involved. He does not point out why the evidence was admissible. No showing is made as to why the errors, if there were any, were prejudicial. No authorities are cited. 'Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in respect to various rulings admitting and rejecting evidence. . . . Counsel merely states in each instance that the court erred and follows the statement with a reference to the transcript, leaving us to follow up the reference and thus ascertain the nature of question, objection, and ruling. In a somewhat similar situation we said: "Such a casual presentation of points, if followed up, would impose upon us a labor which is within the peculiar province of counsel, and which does not come within the range of our duty. We are not called upon to consider points so presented."' [Citation.]"

Barbara contends that the court made "numerous procedural errors which changed the outcome of the trial," without explaining what those errors purportedly were. She also asserts that she was not awarded the proceeds from the home she brought into the marriage, but she has not identified in the record where a decision was made on that issue, nor does she offer legal argument, supported by citations to the record and the facts, as to why the court's ultimate disposition was in error. With this scant presentation we need not and cannot address Barbara's claim. (*Placer*, *supra*, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 814.)

Barbara's final paragraph under the "Court Errors" section complains that the proceedings were confusing, with Marc's attorneys preparing multiple statements of decision and the court accepting them despite "substantial errors in Marc's favor." Here again, Barbara has not identified any of these errors nor developed any cognizable legal argument for us to review. She states that Marc's counsel filed a notice of errata concerning the statement of decision that referenced the confusion, but some confusion in the trial court after protracted litigation does not necessarily present a basis for reversal, nor does Barbara offer any legal argument to explain how the confusion offers grounds for appeal. She claims that because she proceeded in propria persona, the proceedings "were unnecessarily biased against" her, but she offers no citations to the record to support her contention. She similarly fails to support her assertions that she was promised help by the trial court and by opposing counsel, none of which was delivered, nor does she offer any legal authority for her apparent contention that she was entitled to this unexplained "help" from opposing counsel or from the court. She concludes that she filed numerous documents hoping to have them considered, and lists some documents, again without citations to the record. Barbara does not indicate what happened when she made these filings or whether she contends there was error with respect to the court's determinations on these documents. This is insufficient to set forth an argument on appeal. "No reasons being assigned or set forth in the brief why the rulings of the court were not correct, it is not incumbent upon an appellate court to look for reasons." (*Brown v. Brown* (1930) 104 Cal.App. 480, 489.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal.

ZELON, J.

We concur:

WOODS, Acting P. J.

JACKSON, J.